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ABSTRACT 
 
Building on institutional theory, this paper examines the relationship between the relative 
rule of law of home and host countries, the home country's institutional frame and foreign 
direct investment (FDI). We suggest that firms based in countries with a higher level of 
rule of law will invest more FDI per capita in host countries with comparable or higher 
levels of legal protections. Further, companies based in countries with a lower rule of law 
are accustomed to lower degrees of institutional safeguards. For these latter countries, 
the comparable levels of rule of law between home and host country will not as strongly 
impact FDI per capita. We test our logic through an examination of FDI from two home 
countries with different levels of rule of law: Japan (high) and South Korea (medium). 
Using FDI data from Japanese firms in 114 countries and South Korean firms in 118 
countries, we find that while rule of law is a predictor of FDI per capita, the relative 
nature of the rule of law between home and host countries in higher rule of law home 
countries is also important. In addition, we discover that companies from Japan, a high 
rule of law country do seek out similar or higher rule of law environments for higher 
levels of FDI per capita investments while companies from a medium level rule of law 
country, South Korea, are less beholden to institutional standards. Our study contributes 
to the literature looking at the impact of country-level factors on foreign investment 
decisions, suggesting that it is the comparative rather than absolute values that are 
important to understand as well as the institutional environment in the home country.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
As governments compete to keep their domestic businesses investing at home and 
develop incentives to attract foreign investment, institutional conditions such as 
the rule of law can have a strong impact on a firm's assessment of investment risk 
in host countries (Biglaiser & Staats, 2010; Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; Wang, 
Xu, & Zhu, 2012). Research has indicated that the presence of the rule of law and 
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the protection of property rights are drivers of economic growth and investment, 
even more so than political democracy (Barro, 2000). Furthermore, it has been 
suggested that a host country's rule of law is an important antecedent to critical 
aspects of national economic growth, such as entrepreneurship, capital 
accumulation, innovation, and human capital (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; 
Scully, 1988).  
 
However, the rule of law is not a constant across country boundaries; it is both 
constructed from and impacted by unique institutional forces that alter the cost of 
doing business (Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; 
Pajunen, 2008). The composition of the rule of law differs between countries and 
impacts choices available to both domestic and foreign organisations. As noted 
by Scott and Davis (2007, p. 322), "choices of [company] strategy take place 
against a backdrop of law and public policy that allow and encourage some 
choice, and limit or prevent others." Organisations make choices that recognise 
that the institutional environment defines controls and restricts organisational 
behaviour. This environment can include the legal attributes of the institutions 
that shape societies.  
 
Attention in the international business literature has been focused on 
understanding the influence of institutional conditions in the host country on 
attracting or repelling foreign direct investment (FDI) (Arregle, Miller, Hitt, & 
Beamish, 2013; Chan, Isobe, & Makino, 2008; Ghemawat, 2001). There has also 
been an examination of the (dis)similarity between home and host country 
institutions, a construct termed institutional distance (Kostova, 1999; Kostova & 
Zaheer, 1999). The difference in institutional distance has been theorised to 
impact country choice and the multinational enterprise (MNE) entry strategy (Xu 
& Shenkar, 2002). High institutional distance between home and host countries is 
believed to cause high coordinating costs, making these host countries less 
attractive FDI targets (Jackson & Deeg, 2008). Nevertheless, in the context of the 
rule of law, the foreign investment decision may be more subtle. In particular, do 
the regulative legal conditions in the home country influence investments by 
MNEs in possible host countries? As noted by Henisz and Swaminathan (2008, p. 
539), "Firms' responses and their performance implications to a given 
institutional construct will vary according to multiple criteria including aspects of 
a firm's prior experience in its home country institutional environment as well as 
those of other countries in which it has operated". We advance the premise that 
while the rule of law in a potential host country is an important consideration for 
FDI decisions by MNEs, the regulative institutional conditions in the home 
country will influence where MNEs make foreign investments. In essence, 
companies in countries with high-level rules of law will make different FDI per 
capita investments than companies in countries with mid-level rules of law.  
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To examine this premise, we consider a home country with a high-level rule of 
law (Japan) and a country with a lower-level rule of law (South Korea). We select 
these East Asian countries based on their similarities and their differences, as well 
as their economic importance in the Asia Pacific region (Kim & Lee, 2007; Rios-
Morales & Brennan, 2007). Both countries are located within the same broad 
region and have companies that actively engage in FDI across a wide geographic 
spectrum.  However, as measured by the WGI rule of law index, their rules of law 
are different, with Japan having a high-level rule of law (1.35) compared to a 
medium level for South Korea (0.69), creating conditions that allow for cross-
country comparisons. As a broad measure, we considered high rule of law 
countries to be those who are in the 70th percentile or higher of the WGI rule of 
law index, medium rule of law countries to be those in the 40th to 69th percentile, 
and low rule of law countries to be those below the 40th percentile. As point of 
reference, Japan occurs is in the 86th percentile of all countries, and Korea is in 
the 66th percentile. 
 
The rule of law developed somewhat differently in each of the countries; thus, a 
closer examination of the differences in the rule of law between the two countries 
may help demystify the institutional forces that impact foreign investment from a 
home country perspective. While Japan and South Korea are on the receiving end 
of significant FDI, an examination of their rules of law allows for a better 
understanding of what Japanese and South Korean firms may be looking for in 
host countries, beyond determinants such as industry and market-seeking 
motives.   
 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
While cross-national studies have considered a variety of dimensions, including 
cultural, linguistic, institutional, and political elements (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 
2010), it is the consideration of institutional elements that is gaining significant 
traction amongst international business scholars (Berry et al., 2010; Biglaiser & 
Staats, 2010; Buckley, Cross, Tan, Xin, & Voss, 2008; Chan, Makino, & Isobe, 
2010; Dunning & Lundan, 2008; Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Jackson & Deeg, 
2008; Makino, Beamish, & Zhao, 2004; Pajunen, 2008; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 
2008; Xu & Shenkar, 2002).  Institutions have been defined as representative of 
the rules of the game of society, or more formally, human-devised constraints that 
shape human intervention (North, 1990). These interactions can vary from the 
formal (constitutions and laws) to the informal (norms of behaviour and self-
imposed codes of conduct). Institutions that are able to direct capital to its most 
productive uses, including property rights and an effective legal system, are the 
most successful in making a nation more competitive (Mishkin, 2006).  
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Within this institutional context, the rule of law is an important determinant of 
country legitimacy. The rule of law serves to protect against anarchy, allows 
people to plan their affairs in advance so that they can know the legal 
consequences of their actions, and provides some protection against the 
arbitrariness of state officials. While it is broadly agreed that the rule of law 
incorporates several elements, including "a respect for and enforcement of 
property rights, the functioning of agencies for the enforcement of law and 
maintenance of order, policy and customs, and the judiciary" (Nwabuzor, 2005, p. 
127), there is no seminal definition of the rule of law in management literature 
(O'Donnell, 2004).  
 
Foreign investors look at a host country's rule of law level, amongst other factors, 
as they determine where to place their funding (Globerman & Shapiro, 2003; 
Pajunen, 2008; Wang et al., 2012). As noted by Prime, Subrahmanyam and Lin 
(2012, p. 321), the "government is critical for competitiveness since it sets policy, 
but other supporting institutions such as the legal system are critical for 
sustaining competitive advantage for any nation." Thus, the rule of law becomes 
an important country-level driver of growth as FDI is generally held to benefit the 
host country by providing new job opportunities, increasing technology transfer, 
and complementing domestic investment (Chakrabarti, 2001; Chowdhury & 
Mavrotas, 2006). At the same time, both domestic and foreign investors want to 
know that their investment will be protected by the laws and the enforcement of 
the laws in respective countries. Legal systems protect investors from 
expropriation either by organisational insiders or by external entities, such as 
governments (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000; Nwabuzor, 
2005).  
 
National competitiveness can be characterised by institutions that provide the 
ability of a firm to respond to its environment (Witt & Lewin, 2007). To the 
degree that the institutions of a country constrain a firm's ability to respond to the 
environment, a company can partially escape these institutions by employing FDI 
in those countries that have better institutions than the home country (Witt & 
Lewin, 2007).  One of the foundations that enables a firm to respond to its 
environment is the rule of law. The weaker the rule of law in a host country, the 
less a company is able to protect its assets in that country. As the level of the rule 
of law in the host country increases, the risk associated with transaction costs, 
investment protection, investor rights, monitoring, and enforcement decrease 
even further, making the host country even more attractive for FDI (Haggard, 
MacIntyre, & Tiede, 2008; La Porta et al., 2000). The establishment and 
enforcement of legal rules create an institutional environment at the country level 
that signals legitimacy to out-of-country investors. If the host country's 
institutional environment is weak, that host country will find it more difficult to 
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attract investment (Keefer & Knack, 1997). Thus, we suggest the following 
hypothesis:   
H1: The level of incoming FDI per capita in a host country will be 
positively related to the host country's rule of law.  
While theory suggests that in an attempt to reduce risk and uncertainty, a home 
country's firms will endeavour to invest in a host country with a higher rule of 
law, this is likely not the only factor influencing outbound FDI decisions. As 
noted by Dunning and Lundan (2008, p. 586), "national level institutions affect 
the attractiveness of a given country both as a host and home to MNE activity". 
The national institutional framework in the home country could create a 
familiarity and ease with, as well as a capability of, operating in institutional 
environments that are similar. Recent research has demonstrated that MNEs from 
developing countries are more present and successful in other developing 
countries than their counterparts from developed countries (Cuervo-Cazurra & 
Genc, 2008). As such, companies used to a particular home country environment 
may, under certain conditions, seek out host countries with institutional 
environments more similar to their own, rather than those with more developed 
institutional frameworks.   
 
Institutional theory posits that organisations in similar institutional environments 
will begin to resemble each other as they respond in similar ways to regulatory or 
normative pressures (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Within the international 
business literature, institutions have been considered to be part of the country-
level environment (Xu & Shenkar, 2002); thus, we consider MNEs within a 
country as a collective. The national institutional environment within which the 
MNEs are embedded creates broad, country-level approaches to business. As 
noted by Orru, Biggart and Hamilton (1997, p. 153), "in East Asia, private 
businesses operate according to substantively distinct institutional models that 
differentially shape organizational behaviour and structure." As such, there is a 
broadly similar approach to risk and uncertainty manifested by companies in 
specific countries that is grounded in the home country's institutional 
environment. This should be evident in the discrete ways in which MNEs 
approach and operationalise their FDI decisions. We believe this to be a nuanced 
difference from the institutional difference construct; while the relative 
institutional difference between the home and host countries is relevant, we 
suggest that the institutional conditions of the home country may influence the 
choice of host countries for FDI investments.  
 
In our consideration of the regulative pillars of countries, we look to the 
foundations of the domestic rule of law in Japan and South Korea to provide 
explanations for differences or similarities in FDI patterns. The legal systems in 
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Japan and South Korea are influenced by the German Commercial Code, written 
in 1897 after the unification of Germany. As noted by La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998, p. 1116), "civil laws give investors weaker 
legal rights than common laws do, independent of the level of per capita income." 
Countries with German civil law foundations are believed to provide only mid-
level protection to investors. However, a reaction to weaker laws can be the 
stronger enforcement of them, which is evidenced in countries based on German 
civil law structures (La Porta et al., 1998).  
 
Even though both Japan and South Korea have similar legal origins, there is a 
clear bifurcation in terms of their institutional development. Post World War II, 
Japanese laws were considered to have been significantly influenced by the 
American legal system, particularly in terms of corporate law (La Porta et al., 
1998). American legal systems are predicated on a strong protection of investors 
and an equally strong protection of property rights. This influence on Japanese 
legal systems created more rigorous protections for business, mitigating 
uncertainty and risk. In the 1980's, economic upheaval, political instability and 
changes in the banking industry led to a stronger institutionalisation of Japan's 
legal system as a way of solving challenges. As suggested by Milhaupt (1996: 
50), "legal rules and institutions [were] inserted into patterns of conduct once 
governed principally through a highly relational order." This strengthening of 
Japan's rule of law is also evident when one considers its international ranking on 
rule of law measures; in particular, Japan consistently ranks significantly higher 
on rule of law indices than South Korea (Kaufmann, Kraay, & Mastruzzi, 2007). 
Thus, the fact that there are differences in institutional norms in these home 
countries' legal framework and institutions could lead to different preferences in 
terms of foreign investment. Thus, we suggest the following: 
H2: The home country's rule of law will positively moderate the 
relationship between the rule of law in the host country and its 
inbound FDI per capita such that the relationship will become 
stronger and more positive for a home country with a higher level 
rule of law and will become weaker for a home country with a lower 
level rule of law. 
 
We put forward that the institutional conditions of the home country, on their 
own, impact FDI decisions by MNEs. However, the comparative difference 
between institutional conditions in countries is another potential input into FDI 
decisions. Institutional distance departs from the more conventional economic 
explanations for FDI by focussing on the difference between institutional 
conditions in home and host countries as the key decision factor for FDI decisions 
(Xu & Shenkar, 2002). Recent research has begun to examine the relative nature 
of institutional comparisons, suggesting that companies that have managed to 
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survive weaker institutional environments may be more successful in host 
countries with similar environments than companies from stronger institutional 
environments (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Kostova, 1999). This speaks to a 
more complex relationship than just that of institutional difference: it is not only 
the differences between the two countries, it is how the institutional environment 
in the home country shapes how leaders of firms view the institutional 
environments of host countries.   
 
Figure 1 provides the theoretical model proposed in Hypothesis 2. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Impact of home country rule of law (Japan, South Korea) on the relationship 
between host country rule of law and outbound FDI per capita by the home country 
 
We advance the argument that the relationship between the home country's rule 
of law and the level of FDI is more complex than just the absolute difference in 
institutional levels. Because the rule of law has been demonstrated to be an 
institutional precondition for investment (Haggard et al., 2008; Hewko, 2002), we 
suggest that in the competitive market for FDI, countries would be grouped into 
two segments: those with a rule of law that is higher or equal to the host country's 
rule of law and those with a rule of low that is lower than that of the host country. 
It is the threshold that is important rather than just the differences between the 
institutional conditions. This relational nature of the rule of law between the 
home and host country interacts with the host country's rule of law to influence 
the level of FDI the host country attracts.   
 
The advantage of adopting a threshold approach over one that only considers an 
absolute comparison is particularly valid in cases where the institutions are 
stronger in the host country than in the home country. Considering institutional 
distance does not deconstruct the advantage of being above or below the home 
country. Host countries with more advanced rules of law than the home country 
enjoy, by their relative nature, stronger institutional certainty (Slangen & 
Home Country Rule of Law 
Host Country Rule of 
Law 
FDI from Home Country 
+ 
+ 
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Beugelsdijk, 2010). Investors are aware that they will have stronger protections 
than if they invest domestically. However, it is important to recognise that this 
does not necessarily mean the rule of law is high in the host country; rather, it is 
just higher than that of the home country, which could be quite low.   
 
In situations where there is uncertainty about the possible outcomes of an 
investment decision, the response of investing companies may be to avoid the 
situation completely (Kobrin, 1979). We assert that this state of uncertainty exists 
in those countries where the rule of law is lower than that of the home country. 
Uncertainty created by inconsistencies in the reaction by legal systems and 
institutions in a host country will make it challenging for an investing company to 
understand and determine the possible outcomes and the respective probabilities 
of the success of their investment decisions (Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; 
Slangen & Beugelsdijk, 2010). As the rule of law decreases relative to the home 
country, uncertainty regarding investment protection, investor rights, monitoring, 
and enforcement increases. From the multinational home office perspective, these 
institutional risks and uncertainties would debilitate the inflow of FDI per capita 
(Stoian & Filippaios, 2008).  
 
If we extend this logic, we would expect MNEs based in countries with a high 
rule of law to seek out host countries with a similar or higher rule of law in which 
to make FDI per capita investments. MNEs based in these high-level rule of law 
home countries are used to and expect all the protections and certainty that comes 
with these higher rule of law jurisdictions. They will want host countries that 
offer the same or higher level of investment protection through clearly articulated 
laws, enforcement mechanisms and a fairly administered justice system for their 
higher level FDI per capita investments. Therefore, the threshold for the rule of 
law remains important.  
 
MNEs based in countries with mid-level rules of law may not be as 
discriminating because their home country institutional environment has provided 
them with the experience and ability to work within environments with a greater 
variance of regulative uncertainty. If companies have less certainty around 
business practices because of weaker legal systems in their home country (e.g., no 
intellectual property protection), they must become used to navigating within this 
environment if they are to survive. As such, it may be that companies from home 
countries with a lower rule of law do not view the rule of law in host countries to 
be as critical to their FDI per capita investment decisions as do companies based 
in home countries with a higher rule of law. Therefore, we would expect to see 
companies located in home countries with mid-level rules of law to be 
comfortable investing in a wider variety of host countries, i.e., both those with 
lower and higher levels of the rule of law than their own.  Thus, we suggest the 
following: 
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H3: The positive relationship between the rule of law in the host 
country and its inbound FDI per capita (see H1) will be moderated 
by the relative rule of law between the two countries such that where 
the rule of law in the host country is higher than the home country's 
rule of law, the relationship will be stronger and more positive, 
whereas for host countries where the rule of law is lower than the 
home country's rule of law, the relationship will be weaker. 
 
Figure 2 provides the theoretical model proposed in Hypothesis 3.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Impact of the relative host country rule of law (above or below that of the home 
country) on the relationship between the host country rule of law and outbound FDI per 
capita by the home country 
 
METHODOLOGY 
Dependent Variable 
FDI per capita 
 
The dependent variable, FDI per capita, was defined as the amount of Japanese 
and South Korean FDI invested per capita in a particular country. By examining 
FDI on a per capita basis, we are able to build in a control for country size. The 
use of FDI per capita as a dependent variable is prevalent in international 
business research on the determinants of FDI from an economic and institutional 
perspective (Fan, Morck, Xu, & Yeung, 2009; Harms & Ursprung, 2002).  
 
Data on Japanese FDI were obtained from material published by Toyo Keizai, 
Inc. of Japan, which includes investment data of Japanese subsidiaries around the 
world and is published on an annual basis. The Toyo Keizai (TK) database 
Relative Rule of Law 
Host Country Rule of 
Law 
FDI from Home 
Country 
+ 
+ 
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contains cross-sectional information on the subsidiaries of over 5,000 Japanese 
parent firms and has been used extensively in previous research (Voyer & 
Beamish, 2004). Data on South Korean FDI were obtained from material 
collected and published annually by Korea Eximbank. Japanese investments in 
114 countries and South Korean investments in 118 countries were included in 
this study. Population data were sourced from the World Bank database. 
Independent Variables 
Host country's rule of law 
 
Due to the breadth and robustness of the sampling methodology, we used the 
World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), in particular, their rule 
of law index. The WGI provides an evaluation of the broad rule of law conditions 
(Pajunen, 2008; Skaaning, 2010). The WGI contains information on 212 
countries and territories and is aggregated from hundreds of specific and 
disaggregated individual variables from 33 different data sources provided by 30 
different organisations. The advantage of using an index rather than individual 
indicators is that the use of multiple measures allows for the inclusion of more 
countries, enabling comparisons across a broader set of countries (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, & Zoido, 1999). In addition, aggregate indicators are more reliable than 
individual indicators. The WGI rule of law index was compiled from 960 
business information providers, 371 surveys of firms or households, 410 non-
governmental organisations and 655 public sector organisations for a total of 
2,396 data sources. The median number of sources per country for the rule of law 
was 11, with indices available for 202 countries and territories (Kaufmann et al., 
2007). Using the single year (2003) for WGI rule of law indices was deemed 
appropriate for this analysis (Voyer & Beamish, 2004), as an examination of the 
available rule of law indices for the countries included in this study indicated that 
they have been relatively constant over time. 
Home country's rule of law 
 
To test our hypothesis that the institutional nature of the rule of law in the home 
country impacts the relationship between the rule of law in the host country and 
the amount of FDI per capita, we created a binary variable where 0 was the rule 
of law in South Korea and 1 was the rule of law in Japan.  
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Relative rule of law 
 
Whether a host country's rule of law is higher or lower than that of the home 
country could impact the willingness of a home country to invest in that 
jurisdiction. Hypothesis 3 requires that the population of countries in our sample 
be divided into two groups: (1) those that have a rule of law index value equal to 
or greater than the home country's rule of law index value and (2) those that are 
less than the home country's rule of law index value. The WGI rule of law index 
also provides standard errors for all of the index values; to determine the 
relationship between home and host countries' rule of law indices, these standard 
errors were considered (Kaufmann et al., 2007). The Japanese rule of law index 
value for 2003 was 1.35 with a standard error of 0.14. Therefore, the lower limit 
of the Japanese rule of law index score was set at 1.21. The South Korean rule of 
law index value for 2003 was 0.69, with a standard error of 0.16. Therefore, the 
lower limit of the South Korean rule of law index score was set at 0.53. For every 
host country in the Japanese and South Korean sample, we added their standard 
error for the Rule of Law Index for 2003 to their rule of law index value to arrive 
at their adjusted value. We then created a binary variable where 1 equals host 
countries with rules of law equal to or higher than the home country and 0 equals 
countries with lower rules of law than the home country.  
To account for other possible influences, we included GDP per capita, 
government consumption, the inflation rate, labour growth, cultural practices and 
values, and industry as control variables. 
Statistical Analysis 
In all of the models, FDI per capita was the dependent variable. The independent 
variables (depending on the model) included the host country's rule of law, the 
home country's rule of law (constructed as a binary for Japan or South Korea) and 
the relative rule of law (above or below the home country). The aforementioned 
control variables were included in all of the models. To ensure the ability to 
cross-compare variables constructed through different methods, all continuous 
independent and control variables were standardised or centred where 
appropriate. The correlation matrix is presented in Table 1.  
 
            
 David W. Kunsch, Karin L. Schnarr and W. Glenn Rowe 
 
158 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 T
ab
le
 1
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
st
at
is
tic
s a
nd
 c
or
re
la
tio
ns
 
                                             
**
 C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
1 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
 
* 
C
or
re
la
tio
n 
is
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 a
t t
he
 0
.0
5 
le
ve
l (
2-
ta
ile
d)
 
The Relational Effect of the Rule of Law 
 
159 
 
   Ta
bl
e 
2 
Re
su
lts
 o
f r
eg
re
ss
io
n 
an
al
ys
is
a 
                                              
 
 
 
 
a  
Fi
gu
re
s r
ep
re
se
nt
 u
ns
ta
nd
ar
di
se
d 
be
ta
 c
oe
ff
ic
ie
nt
s 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 v
ar
ia
bl
e 
= 
FD
I p
er
 c
ap
ita
 
† 
p 
< 
.1
0;
 *
 p
 <
 .0
5;
 *
* 
p 
< 
.0
1;
 *
**
 p
 <
 . 
00
1 
 
 David W. Kunsch, Karin L. Schnarr and W. Glenn Rowe 
 
160 
DATA ANALYSIS 
We tested our three hypotheses by first running a baseline model (Model 1 in 
Table 2) with the dependent variable and the control variables. Table 2 details the 
results of each of the models. Model 2 added the host country's rule of law 
independent variable, thus testing Hypothesis 1. Similarly, Model 3 tested 
Hypothesis 2, and Model 4 tested Hypothesis 3. Additional models, while not 
hypothesised, are included in Table 2 to clearly demonstrate the contribution of 
each of the independent variables to the overall model.  
 
Table 2 presents the results of the regression analysis using unstandardised 
coefficients. The first hypothesis (Model 2) proposed that host countries with a 
higher rule of law would receive a greater share of FDI per capita. The regression 
for Model 2 was significant (R2 = 14.44%, F9, 217 = 4.23; p < 0.001). As evidenced 
in Table 2, there is a positive and somewhat significant relationship (t = 1.64; p < 
0.1) between the host country's rule of law and levels of FDI per capita. 
Hypothesis 1 is supported, although the relationship is weak.  
 
Model 3 specifically considered whether institutional differences in the home 
countries (Japan and South Korea) were significant in impacting the relationship 
between the host country's rule of law and FDI investment. Model 3 was also 
significant (R2 = 31.2%, F11, 217 = 8.48; p < 0.001), and the interaction between the 
host country's rule of law and home country's rule of law was positive and 
significant (t = 4.53; p < 0.001). Hypothesis 2 is supported, which is further 
evidenced by graphing the results (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3. Impact of home country rule of law (Japan, South Korea) on the relationship 
between host country rule of law and outbound FDI per capita by the home country 
High
FD
I/c
ap
ita
Host Country Rule of Law
Low HighMedium
Medium
Low
Japan
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Figure 3 demonstrates the finding that for Japanese investment in other countries, 
the higher the host country's rule of law, the higher the level of FDI invested by 
Japanese companies in the host country. Figure 3 demonstrates a similar result for 
Korea but at a lower intensity than that for Japan. Thus, the effect of the host 
country's rule of law on incoming FDI to that country is lower for Korea than it is 
for Japan. 
 
The third hypothesis (Model 4) proposed that the relative difference between the 
rule of law in the home and host country would moderate the relationship 
between the host country's rule of law and the level of FDI per capita. Hypothesis 
3 attempts to examine the effect of the situation where a host country could have 
a high rule of law, but it is still lower than that of the home country. This 
hypothesis required a segmentation of the data into two groups: the first group 
had a rule of law equal to or greater than that of the host country, and the second 
group had a rule of law that was lower than that of the host country. There was a 
significant difference between the two groups' FDI per capita; countries with a 
rule of law lower than that of the host country had a mean FDI per capita of 6.26 
(standard deviation of 22.43), while countries with a rule of law higher than that 
of the host country had a mean FDI per capita of 25.93 (standard deviation of 
55.40). This result is illustrated in Figure 4. 
Host Rule of Law Above
Home Country
High
FD
I/c
ap
ita
Host Country Rule of Law
Low HighMedium
Medium
Low
Host Rule of Law Below
Home Country
 
Figure 4. Impact of the relative host country rule of law (above or below that of the home 
country) on the relationship between the host country rule of law and outbound FDI per 
capita by the home country 
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Again, Model 4 was significant (R2 = 16.9%, F11, 217 = 3.80 p < 0.001). In 
addition, there was a positive and significant interaction between the relative rule 
of law and the rule of law in the host country (t = 1.75; p < 0.05), suggesting that 
the positioning of a host country's rule of law vis à vis the rule of law in the home 
country is important. Therefore, Hypothesis 3 is supported. 
 
Based upon the significant results of these three hypotheses, we suggest that the 
rule of law in the host country, the legal institutional conditions of the home 
country itself, and, finally, the relative difference between the rule of law in the 
home and host country add additional predictive power for FDI per capita beyond 
that contributed only by the control variables of GDP per capita, government 
consumption, inflation, labour growth, cultural practices and values, and industry. 
This was evidenced through an R2 increase in each of the models when measured 
against the baseline  (Model 1), as presented in Table 2.  
  
 
DISCUSSION 
This research heeds the call of Henisz and Swaminathan (2008, p. 537) that 
"international business research necessarily requires attention to the institutional 
characteristics that alter the costs of engaging in business activity of a given form 
in one nation as compared to another." We add to the body of work that examines 
factors beyond the traditional, locational advantages of where, when and why 
firms invest in foreign countries. In so doing, we support the suggestion of Peng 
et al. (2008) that the institutional-view be observed as complimentary to the 
industry and resource-based views commonly used in international business 
literature. While our analysis supports previous research demonstrating that the 
higher a host country's rule of law index is, the higher the level of FDI per capita 
it will receive, we look beyond this base concept by demonstrating that it is both 
the institutional conditions in the home country and the relative nature of the rule 
of law between the home and host country that are relevant when trying to 
understand and attract FDI. In doing so, we clarify the relationship between the 
rule of law index of the host country and the legal institutional differences 
between the home country and the host country. We illustrate that the rule of law 
indices in the home and host countries should not be considered as operating in a 
vacuum but rather in conjunction with each other in relation to FDI.  
 
We have also found some support for the influence of the institutional conditions 
of the home county on companies' FDI decisions. This study discovers that 
companies are comfortable investing in host countries with institutional 
characteristics similar to their own home country. While departing somewhat 
from the conventional wisdom that companies will only seek stability in foreign 
markets, we adopt an institutional theory approach, suggesting that a firm looking 
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to make an investment choice between two foreign countries will favour 
committing higher levels of FDI per capita to the country that has laws, 
governance systems, legal stability, and procedures that match (or exceed) those 
protections and expectations that would exist in the home country if it is based in 
a high rule of law country (e.g., Japan). However, if a firm is from a country 
exhibiting a medium rule of law rating (e.g., South Korea), our institutional 
theory approach suggests that firms in this country are comfortable investing in a 
host country with similar rules of law because they have experience with more 
flexible legal frameworks. By taking this more nuanced perspective, we 
incorporate the direct consideration of institutional conditions in the home 
county, particularly in terms of how they may influence an MNE's assessment of 
host jurisdictions. This may be positive news for countries with less stable 
institutional environments (i.e., those with a rule of law index similar to a 
medium rule of law index country) as they may find investors in countries that 
manifest similar institutional characteristics.   
 
 
IMPLICATIONS 
Our study results suggest that, based on the countries examined, the importance 
of the rule of law to FDI decisions may be influenced by the condition of 
institutions (the rule of law) in the home country itself. The two East Asian 
countries explored in this study, Japan and South Korea, have high and medium 
rule of law indices, respectively. In Japan, where the rule of law is high, our 
results suggest that a similarly strong rule of law in the host country is a potential 
factor for FDI per capita decisions. This may suggest that companies in a home 
country with a high rule of law index may consider their rule of law level to be a 
threshold for what they seek in institutional conditions in host countries.  
 
In contrast, the rule of law appears to be less important to FDI decisions for 
companies in countries with mid-level rule of law indices, such as South Korea. 
This may be because South Korean businesses are used to operating with less 
certainty around legal conditions and so the institutional importance is decreased. 
These results suggest that the influence of the home country's institutional 
conditions may create fundamentally different approaches to FDI decisions. Host 
countries seeking investments from companies in high rule of law home countries 
may want to consider adopting measures that could increase their rule of law to 
become more attractive to companies based in these higher rule of law countries. 
If the host country already has a high rule of law index (such as Japan), it may be 
an advantage to them when the companies in the targeted home country have a 
similarly high level. Our preliminary research suggests that host countries with 
mid or low rule of law indices would do well to target companies in home 
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countries with mid-range rules of law, as these countries seem less influenced by 
strong host country institutional conditions when making FDI decisions.   
 
Our research extends the utilisation of institutional theory into FDI decisions by 
looking at institutions at the country level. Biglaiser and Staats (2011) suggest 
that researchers might better focus on the institutions within democracies (rather 
than the presence of democracy itself) as a determinant of FDI, reinforcing the 
ongoing importance of institutions to international business study. We believe 
that while there has been much new conceptual development that has occurred 
that specifically considers an international context; the impact of home country 
institutional conditions on FDI decisions is a new perspective that adds to the 
current state of the research. Our research extends the work of scholars, such as 
Pajunen (2008) and Berry et al. (2010), who look at the importance of 
institutional factors in host countries but do not link it back to institutional 
conditions in the home country.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The rule of law is a construct that implicitly pervades almost every FDI decision 
made by companies all over the world. Firms question whether investments made 
in host countries will be protected from expropriation, whether their intellectual 
property will be protected, whether they will be dealt with fairly in disputes with 
local suppliers or customers, and whether they can expect stability in national 
institutions. These are not insignificant questions, and they are all encompassed 
within the consideration of the rule of law. This study lends initial support to the 
contention that while firms are investing in countries that have a higher rule of 
law, it is a relative relationship that is, to a certain degree, dependent on the 
institutional conditions in the home country. Therefore, countries looking to 
attract FDI may not need to strengthen their institutional systems to do so. This 
research suggests that they may just need to target their marketing approach to 
countries with similar institutional conditions. 
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